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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
West Run Student Housing Associates, LLC (West Run), 
Mt. Tabor Village, LLC (Mt. Tabor), and Campus View JMU, 
LLC (Campus View) (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal the District 
Court‘s order dismissing their amended complaint against 
Huntington National Bank.  We will affirm in part, vacate in 
part, and remand. 
I 
This lawsuit arose from three commercial real estate 
development projects for student housing at West Virginia 
University (the West Run Project), Virginia Tech (the Mt. Tabor 
Project), and James Madison University
1 
(the Campus View 
Project).  The same group of individuals (Sponsors) sponsored 
each project. 
A. The West Run Project 
In August 2006, the Sponsors formed West Run to 
facilitate the construction and management of off-campus 
housing at West Virginia University in Morgantown, West 
Virginia.  West Run retained CBRE/Melody, a real estate 
broker, for the purpose of securing bank financing for the 
project.  CBRE/Melody provided prospective lenders with 
                                                 
1
 In the pleadings, the District Court opinion, and the 
appellate briefs, this university is referred to as ―James Mason 
University.‖  No such institution exists.  The record cites a 
school in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where James Madison 
University is located. 
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confidential and proprietary information, consisting of ―an 
‗underwriting,‘ a ‗bank package,‘ a loan request, a front end 
appraisal of the project . . . , and financial information for each 
of the Sponsors,‖ in conjunction with its efforts to secure bank 
financing.  Amended Compl. ¶ 9.  In September 2006, West Run 
selected Sky Bank to provide financing for the project, and the 
bank agreed to loan West Run $39.975 million.  On July 1, 
2007, Huntington National Bank (Huntington) became the 
successor-by-merger to Sky Bank‘s rights and obligations under 
the West Run loan transaction. 
The West Run Project was to be constructed in two 
phases.  Phase I was completed on schedule in August 2007.  
The apartments completed during that phase had an occupancy 
rate of 95% in the fall of 2007.  Construction of Phase II was 
completed in August 2008. 
In the fall of 2008, as the West Run Project was being 
completed, construction commenced on an unrelated student 
housing project known as the Copper Beech Townhomes 
(Copper Beech), located across the street from the West Run 
Project.  By the spring of 2009, a number of the Copper Beech 
units were available for rent in competition with those in the 
West Run Project.  According to the amended complaint, it was 
at this time that West Run first learned that ―Huntington had 
participated, to the extent of $20 million, in the financing of 
Copper Beech.‖  Id. ¶ 32.  West Run also alleges that 
Huntington divulged to the Copper Beech developers the 
proprietary West Run information that had been provided by 
CBRE/Melody to Huntington‘s predecessor, Sky Bank. 
The West Run Project‘s overall occupancy dropped from 
95% in the fall of 2007 to 64% in the fall of 2009, which greatly 
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decreased West Run‘s available cash flow.  Consequently, West 
Run anticipated that it would be unable to make the principal 
and interest payments due to Huntington by December 1, 2009.  
West Run contends that its ―occupancy crisis was caused by 
Huntington‘s financing of Copper Beech, with its resulting 
diminishment of [the West Run Project‘s] revenues.‖  Id. ¶ 40. 
B. The Mt. Tabor Project 
In October 2007, the Sponsors formed Mt. Tabor to 
facilitate the construction and management of an off-campus 
housing project at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia.  The 
Mt. Tabor Project was smaller than the West Run Project, 
consisting of only thirty-eight condominium units.  Huntington 
agreed to finance this development with a $6 million loan, to be 
disbursed in installments.  The loan agreement, however, 
required Mt. Tabor to sell at least twenty-nine units before 
Huntington was required to fund the entire project.  In the spring 
of 2009, as the project was nearing completion, Huntington 
refused to provide the last construction advance, and the project 
failed. 
C. The Campus View Project 
In February 2008, the Sponsors formed Campus View to 
facilitate the construction and management of an off-campus 
housing project at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, 
Virginia.  The Campus View Project consisted of one hundred 
sixty-eight condominium units to be constructed in three phases. 
 Huntington agreed to finance the Campus View Project with a 
$10.5 million revolving line of credit, which was secured by a 
mortgage on the property.  The loan agreement required Campus 
View to sell at least fifty-four units before Huntington was 
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required to fund Phase II.  In or around August 2009, 
Huntington refused to extend further construction advances to 
Campus View. 
II 
On December 22, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a three-count 
verified complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania.  In Count I, West Run alleged that 
Huntington had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing 
by financing the Copper Beech project.  In Counts II and III, 
Campus View and Mt. Tabor each alleged breach of contract 
based on Huntington‘s failure to provide funds under their 
respective construction loan agreements. 
On January 20, 2012, Huntington removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  A week later, Huntington filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The motion argued that West Run‘s claim (Count I) 
should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim.  It also 
argued that Mt. Tabor‘s and Campus View‘s claims (Counts II 
and III) should be dismissed because the number of pre-sold 
condominium units listed in the complaint established that they 
had sold an insufficient number of units to require Huntington to 
disburse additional funds pursuant to the construction loan 
agreements.
2
 
                                                 
2
 In the original complaint, Mt. Tabor averred that it 
had pre-sold twenty-seven units and Campus View averred 
that it had pre-sold thirty-six units. 
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In response to Huntington‘s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint, which simply omitted the factual 
allegations regarding the number of pre-sold units.  The 
amended complaint also included a new count, listed as Count I, 
in which West Run alleged that Huntington had breached its 
duty of good faith and fair dealing by disclosing confidential 
information it had received from CBRE/Melody to the Copper 
Beech developers.  The other counts were renumbered Counts 
II, III, and IV, in the same order as they originally appeared. 
Huntington then filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint, again arguing that West Run‘s claims should be 
dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim.  As to the claims 
of Mt. Tabor and Campus View, Huntington argued that they 
failed to state a claim based on the admissions as to the pre-sales 
deficiencies contained in the original complaint. 
The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the 
amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice.  W. Run 
Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2012 WL 
1739820, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2012).  This appeal 
followed.
3
 
 
                                                 
3
 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review of a district 
court‘s dismissal order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
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III 
Plaintiffs raise three arguments on appeal: (1) the District 
Court erred when it concluded that West Run did not plead 
sufficient facts to support its allegation that Huntington provided 
confidential information regarding the West Run Project to the 
Copper Beech developers; (2) the District Court erred when it 
concluded that Huntington had no duty to West Run to refrain 
from financing Copper Beech; and (3) the District Court erred 
by deeming the unit pre-sale numbers listed in the superseded 
original complaint to be binding judicial admissions.  We will 
examine each argument in turn. 
A 
The District Court determined that West Run alleged 
insufficient facts to support the conclusion that Huntington 
provided any proprietary information regarding the West Run 
Project to the Copper Beech developers.  We agree.  To survive 
a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint ―must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level‖ 
and the complaining party must offer ―more than labels and 
conclusions‖ or ―a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action.‖  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
Just as the complaint in Twombly contained only ―an 
allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of 
conspiracy,‖ 550 U.S. at 556, here West Run offers no more 
than an allegation that confidential information was disclosed 
and a bare assertion that this violated the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.  West Run does not plead facts regarding the nature 
of the disclosed information, who disclosed it, or when it was 
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disclosed.  Nor does the amended complaint contain any 
corroborating factual averments that confidential information 
was disclosed at all.  ―[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 
‗show[n]‘—‗that the pleader is entitled to relief.‘‖  Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court‘s dismissal of Count I. 
B 
In Count II, West Run alleges that Huntington breached 
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by providing a 
loan to Copper Beech for a competing housing development 
near the West Run Project.  The District Court dismissed this 
claim after observing that the loan agreement between West Run 
and Huntington contained no language that would bar 
Huntington from making loans to Copper Beech, and finding 
that West Run‘s broad conception of the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing would essentially bar Huntington from 
financing anyone West Run considers a competitor. 
Although ―[e]very contract imposes upon each party a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement,‖ Kaplan v. Cablevision of PA, Inc., 671 A.2d 716, 
722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 205) (internal quotation marks omitted), that duty is 
not limitless.  Rather, there must be some relationship to the 
provisions of the contract itself to invoke the duty of good faith. 
 See id. at 721–22; Agrecycle, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 783 
A.2d 863, 867 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (―The good faith 
obligation may be implied to allow enforcement of the contract 
terms in a manner that is consistent with the parties‘ reasonable 
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expectations.‖).  Otherwise, the court would violate the axiom 
that it ―not imply a different contract than that which the parties 
have expressly adopted.‖  Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 
519 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. 1986).  In other words, the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing does not license courts to interpose 
contractual terms to which the parties never assented. 
In this case, we agree with the District Court that the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend as far 
as Plaintiffs suggest.  West Run argues for a duty of good faith 
external to its contract with Huntington.  Pennsylvania courts 
have rejected such attempts to rewrite a contract.  See, e.g., 
Kaplan, 671 A.2d at 721–22 (defendant cable companies did not 
breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing by allegedly 
providing ―insufficient, confusing and misleading 
representations regarding the subscribers‘ right to credit for 
service interruptions‖ because the cable companies ―were not 
contractually bound to provide such service or credit and 
. . . made no representations regarding the right to such credits‖). 
 We do likewise and hold that the District Court did not err 
when it dismissed Count II. 
C 
Plaintiffs‘ final argument is that the District Court erred 
by deeming pre-sale numbers in the original complaint to be 
binding judicial admissions, notwithstanding the fact that the 
original complaint had been superseded by an amended 
complaint. 
The loan agreements at issue explicitly conditioned 
Huntington‘s obligation to fund construction advances upon Mt. 
Tabor and Campus View achieving a certain level of pre-sold 
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condominium units.  In the original complaint, Mt. Tabor 
averred that it had pre-sold twenty-seven units and Campus 
View averred that it had pre-sold thirty-six units.  Because the 
number of units listed in the original complaint was insufficient 
to trigger Huntington‘s obligation to fund the loans, Huntington 
moved to dismiss.  In response, Plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint that omitted those pre-sale averments after they 
―realiz[ed] that the presale numbers in the original Complaint 
were in error.‖  Appellants‘ Br. 26.  Thereafter, Huntington filed 
another motion to dismiss, contending that the District Court 
should accept the averments in the original complaint as judicial 
admissions.  The District Court agreed and granted the motion.  
As we shall explain, the District Court erred given the 
procedural posture of the case. 
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
a party to amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 
21 days after serving it or within 21 days after service of a 
responsive pleading.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).  ―[T]he amended 
complaint ‗supersedes the original and renders it of no legal 
effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or 
adopts the earlier pleading.‘‖  New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. 
Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1504 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (quoting Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 
504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985)).  This approach ―ensures that a 
particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on 
technicalities.‖  Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d 
Cir. 1990); see also 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1474 (3d ed. 2008) (―A 
liberal policy toward allowing amendments to correct errors in 
the pleadings clearly is desirable and furthers one of the basic 
objectives of the federal rules—the determination of cases on 
their merits.‖). 
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Although the District Court acknowledged these 
principles, it reasoned that ―a plaintiff is not permitted to take a 
contrary position in a complaint in order to avoid dismissal.‖  W. 
Run, 2012 WL 1739820, at *6.  The District Court relied on two 
of our decisions for this proposition: Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s 
Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2008), and 
Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 275 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  See W. Run, 2012 WL 1739820, at *6.  But neither 
of those decisions involved the question of whether a plaintiff 
could amend a complaint to cure a purported factual mistake.  In 
Sovereign Bank, a party attempted to take a legal position on 
appeal that was contradicted by an allegation in its complaint, 
and we held that the allegation was a binding judicial admission. 
 See Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 181.  In Parilla, we denied the 
appellee‘s motion to dismiss an appeal for lack of standing 
because, inter alia, factual concessions in her own complaint 
revealed the basis for appellants‘ standing.  See Parilla, 368 
F.3d at 275. 
Even if Plaintiffs‘ allegations in the original complaint 
constituted judicial admissions, it does not follow that they may 
not amend them.   This Court and several of our sister courts 
have recognized that judicial admissions may be withdrawn by 
amendment.  See Giannone v. U.S. Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 
547 (3d Cir. 1956) (recognizing that ―withdrawn or superseded 
pleadings‖ do not constitute judicial admissions); see also, e.g., 
InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144–45 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(―An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and 
facts that are neither repeated nor otherwise incorporated into 
the amended complaint no longer bind the pleader.‖); 188 LLC 
v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (―When 
a party has amended a pleading, allegations and statements in 
earlier pleadings are not considered judicial admissions.‖); Huey 
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v. Honeywell, Inc., 82 F.3d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1996) (―When a 
pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion 
ceases to be a conclusive judicial admission . . . .‖ (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. 
Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 101 (5th Cir. 1993) (―To the extent that 
Hibernia did make a ‗judicial confession[]‘ [in its original 
complaint,] that confession was amended away.‖ (citations 
omitted)).  Indeed, effectively disallowing amendment by 
looking to the original pleading is contrary to the liberal 
amendment policy embodied in Rule 15. 
Nor was dismissal warranted because Plaintiffs sought to 
―take a contrary position . . . to avoid dismissal.‖  W. Run, 2012 
WL 1739820, at *6.  Plaintiffs routinely amend complaints to 
correct factual inadequacies in response to a motion to dismiss.  
See 6 Wright & Miller, supra § 1474 (―Perhaps the most 
common use of Rule 15(a) is by a party seeking to amend in 
order to cure a defective pleading.‖).  That is so even when the 
proposed amendment flatly contradicts the initial allegation.  
See, e.g., 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 734–36 (noting that district court 
permitted plaintiff to amend complaint to assert a contradictory 
factual position in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 
holding that earlier allegation was no longer a binding judicial 
admission in light of that amendment); cf. Gray v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that 
ADEA plaintiff amended his complaint as of right in response to 
motion to dismiss to ―change[] the date of the alleged 
discriminatory action‖ for statute of limitations purposes, 
―ma[king] the filing of the discrimination charge timely under 
the pleadings‖). 
We find the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in Kelley v. 
Crosfield Catalysts, 135 F.3d 1202 (7th Cir. 1998), particularly 
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instructive because it considered the question presented in this 
appeal under nearly identical procedural circumstances.  In 
Kelley, the plaintiff filed a Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) action against his employer.  He alleged in his 
complaint that he had been fired because he took leave from 
work to ―obtain custody of [his] kids.‖  Id. at 1203.  The 
employer filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that 
seeking custody of one‘s own children was not covered by the 
FMLA.  Id.  The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint that 
omitted that assertion.  Id.  The employer again moved to 
dismiss, arguing that the admissions contained in the original 
complaint were binding.  Id. at 1203–04.  The district court 
granted the motion.  Id. at 1204. 
The Seventh Circuit reversed.  It first noted that ―[i]t is 
well-established that an amended pleading supersedes the 
original pleading; facts not incorporated into the amended 
pleading are considered functus officio.‖  Id.  It then explained 
that ―[i]f certain facts or admissions from the original complaint 
become functus officio, they cannot be considered by the court 
on a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  A court cannot 
resuscitate these facts when assessing whether the amended 
complaint states a viable claim.‖  Id. at 1205.  Applying these 
principles, the court concluded: 
Any facts that Kelley had pleaded in his first two 
complaints were effectively nullified for 12(b)(6) 
purposes when he filed his Second Amended 
Complaint, which did not reference those facts.  
There was no longer any ―confession‖ in the 
pleadings on which the district court could rely 
when reviewing Crosfield‘s motion to dismiss the 
Second Amended Complaint. 
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Id.  This approach is consistent with how other courts of appeals 
have treated the issue.  See, e.g., InterGen, 344 F.3d at 144–45; 
Huey, 82 F.3d at 333; Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 997 F.2d at 101. 
This is not to say, however, that a party‘s assertion of 
contrary factual positions in the pleadings is without 
consequence.  A superseded pleading may be offered as 
evidence rebutting a subsequent contrary assertion.  See 
Giannone, 238 F.2d at 547; see also InterGen, 344 F.3d at 144–
45; 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 736; Huey, 82 F.3d at 333; Andrews v. 
Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Raulie v. United States, 400 F.2d 487, 526 (10th Cir. 1968).  For 
example, at the summary judgment stage, a district court may 
consider a statement or allegation in a superseded complaint as 
rebuttable evidence when determining whether summary 
judgment is proper.  See 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 735–36.  
However, at the motion to dismiss stage, when the district court 
typically may not look outside the four corners of the amended 
complaint, the plaintiff cannot be bound by allegations in the 
superseded complaint. 
Applying these principles to this appeal, the District 
Court was required to convert Huntington‘s motion to dismiss 
into a motion for summary judgment before looking beyond the 
amended complaint to the pre-sale numbers contained in the 
original complaint.  See Kelley, 135 F.3d at 1204.  We will 
vacate and remand so the District Court can give Plaintiffs a 
chance to provide evidence showing that the pre-sale numbers in 
the original complaint were incorrect (as they now claim) and 
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that the real numbers meet the contractual requirements.
4
 
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court with respect to its dismissal of Counts I and II of the 
amended complaint, and we will vacate and remand with respect 
to Counts III and IV. 
                                                 
4
 We note that the original complaint, filed in state court, 
was verified as true and correct under penalty of perjury by 
Russell P. Mills, the manager of West Run.  Although the fact 
that the original complaint was verified does not alter the 
principle that an amended complaint will supersede the original, 
see King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per 
curiam), that verification places a heavy burden on Plaintiffs to 
explain why the number of pre-sold units was incorrect. 
 
We also note that although complaints filed in federal 
court are usually not verified by the parties, Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney to certify 
that a pleading ―is not being presented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation‖ and that ―the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), 
(3). 
 
